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TERRORISM AS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME
Questions of Responsibility and Complicity
By PROFESSOR SOMPONG SUCHARITKUL *

Terrorism is a phenomenon in the contemporary world which
occupies the attention of the international community.

Terrorism

as an international crime is readily more comprehensible and
susceptible of clearer definition than sheer acts of terrorism by
whomsoever performed.
This paper is confined to questions of responsibility and
complicity in connection with terrorism as an international
crime, whatever the definition is ultimately adopted of
"terrorism," and whatever the meaning to be ascribed to an
"international crime."
Taking the cue from Professor Yoram Dinstein,l some of the
salient features and common elements present in the varying
definition of terrorism as an international crime still permit a
scientific and intelligible treatment of a number of questions
relating to responsibility and complicity.
As terrorism is inter alia an offense against the peace and
security of mankind according to the latest draft code undertaken
by the International Law Commission,2 it follows that one of the

*
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1.
See the lead article, opening statement by Professor
Yoram Dinstein, seven characteristic dichotomies, pp.4-5.
2.
UN Doc. A/CN.4/368, Compendium of Relevant
International Instruments, 1983; Yearbook of the ILC, 1986,
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inevitable elements is the object or victim of terrorism as a
crime.

Beyond the individuals or groups of persons suffering the

casualties or physical injuries as the result of acts of
terrorism, the target is the victim state.

Terrorism is a crime

directed against a state, hence it offends the conscience of
mankind and the international community at the same time.
Whatever the ultimate, intermediate or immediate target of
terrorism, there is to be found a victim state, against which
acts of terrorism are directed.

The victim is primarily a state

in conventional definition,3 although of late international
organizations as subjects of international law have been upgraded
as possible victims of acts of terrorism along with entities such
as National or People's Liberation groups or Organization or
Committee. 4

Acts of terrorism committed or directed against

international organizations or national liberation movements may
fall within the definition of terrorism as an international
crime. 5
A second element which is pertinent to the questions of
responsibility or liability is the author or perpetrator or
subject of the international crime of terrorism.

Whether or not

A/CN.4/387.
3.
See the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment
of Terrorism;-adopted by the International Conference on the
Repression of Terrorism on November 16, 1937, cited in U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/368 at pp.18-22, especially article 7, para. 2.
4.
Report of the Geneva seminar on the Phenomenon of
Terrorism in the Contemporary World, 23-25 June 1987, by the
Organization of Islamic Conference No. OIC/ISPT/REP. 1 at p.9
(Terrorism and International Law).
5.
Ibid., pp.15-16 ({2) Terrorism and National Liberation
Struggles).
-
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the applicable definition extends to crimes committed by
individuals or groups of persons without the aid, assistance or
participation by a state or an international organization, it is
clear that it may involve an active part or role performed by a
state or a group of states or an international organization or a
group of international organizations.

The involvement of a state

may consist in the encouragement or toleration of the commission
or organization in its territory or control of acts of
terrorism. 6

It is this second element which is relevant to the

questions of responsibility which will form the first principal
limb of this presentation, the other main concern of this study
is centered upon the questions of complicity or degrees of
participation or involvement in the planning, commission or
actual consummation of terrorist acts or activities, or other
supporting activities, as accessory before or after the facts of
the crime of terrorism.

Attention will accordingly be

concentrated on these two themes, viz., responsibility and
complicity.

RESPONSIBILITY
One of the initial questions that remains uppermost in the
minds of those attending the colloquium on Terrorism as an
International Crime relates to "responsibility."

The question

6.
See, e.g., Article 4(D) of the Draft Code of Offences
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, fourth report by
Minister Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur of the International
Law Commission, 1985, A/CN.4/387, 1985 Yearbook of the ILC, vol.
II, Part one, pp.63-86, at pp.77-80, E. Terrorism.
-
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may be validly raised as to who may be held responsible for a
terrorist act or an act of terrorism as an international crime.

I.

THE INDIVIDUAL OFFENDER
Clearly, any person may be criminally responsible for the

commission of an offense against the law of nations.

No one

individual is exempted or exonerated from this responsibility.
There is no such rule as "the King can do no wrong" or "the
Emperor is above the law" or "Caesar's wife is above suspicion."
As terrorism may easily include common crimes or ordinary
offenses of murder, assassination, kidnapping, torture, etc., a
person may be found guilty of such crimes under domestic law, by
a national judicial authority.

The same person may at the same

time be personally and criminally responsible for violation ot
the code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind.
As a matter of human rights, the accused will not be put in
double jeopardy under two different systems, one domestic or
national and another international.

Care should be taken lest

the offender escape both jurisdictions for fear of offending the
rule "ne bis in idem."

The problem may be one of jurisdiction,

prescriptive, adjudicative or enforcement, or lack of or
concurrence of any such jurisdiction or competence of one or more
national authorities.

The amenability of an individual person to

the law of nations on terrorism is beyond controversy.

Each and

every man, woman or child is capable of committing an act of
terrorism, the degree of liability or gravity of punishment may
depend on several factors to be taken into consideration.
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The

individual may be criminally liable and personally punishable, as
well as civilly responsible for the pain, physical injury, death,
and suffering caused to others by his terrorist acts.

II.

THE OFFICIAL OR ORGAN OF A STATE OR INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION
That a person is responsible individually for his or her

acts of terrorism is no longer in question.

But it is

questionable whether responsibility persists in the event of a
superior order.

The defense or excuse of Hrespondeat superior"

has application in certain legal systems, under constitutional
law or administrative law or simply in accordance with the
general principles of law, criminal and civil.
Whatever the extent of individual personal responsibility
for acts of terrorism as an international crime in a given
instance, there is also a distinct possibility that as an
official, or representative or organ of a state or an
international organization, the acts of terrorism in question may
have been commanded by the state or international organization or
committed on its behalf or at its instigation.

Whatever the

degree of attributability or imputability, the acts of terrorism
committed by a state agent or organ of a state is clearly
attributable or imputable to the state, and for which the latter
is responsible.

The same is true of an official or organ of an

international organization.

The individual is responsible both

personally and as an organ or agent of the state or international
organization, quite apart altogether and separate from the fact
that the action or omission may invariably engage the
responsibility of the state or international organization.
- 5 -

The identical position is attained even if the individual
official, agent, organ or representative may have exceeded his
authority.

In order to admit this "objective responsibility" of

the state for acts committed by its officials or organs outside
their competence, "they must have acted at least to all
appearances as competent officials or organs, or they must have
used powers or methods appropriate to their official capacity."7

III.

THE STATE OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
Should the concept of state responsibility be extended to

international organizations as appears to be the rule since the
Reparations case (1949)~8

~hatever is said of state

responsibility in regard to a state is also equally or
approximately applicable to an international organization,
including a national liberation organization created by an
international organization.

7.
Claire Claim, France v. Mexico (1929), Verzyl,
Presiding Commissioner, French-Mexican Claims Commission, 5
R.I.A.A. (United Nations Reports of International Arbitral
Awards) 516.
(4) Responsibility of Mexico for actions of
individual military personnel, acting without orders or against
the wishes of their commanding officers and independently of the
needs and aims of the revolution.
8.
Reparation for Injuries suffered in the service of the
United Nations Case Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949, p.174.
-
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The next series of questions relate to the nature of the
responsibility incumbent upon the state or international
organization for an internationally wrongful act attributable to
it, which in the case under examination is an act of terrorism as
an international crime.

1.

Can an Internationally Wrongful Act be Both an
International Crime and an International Delict?

The classification is found in article 19 of the ILC draft
on State Responsibili ty 9 for an act of a state which constitutes
a breach of an international obligation, being an internationally
wrongful act.

Such an act which results from the breach by a

state of an international obligation so essential for the
protection of fundamental interests of the international
community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that
community as a whole constitutes an international crime.

The

draft articles neither specify terrorism as an international
crime, nor preclude acts of terrorism from the inexhaustive list
of international obligations of essential importance to the
safeguarding of the right to self-determination of people lO and
the maintenance of international peace and security.ll
Paragraph 4 of draft article 19 labels all internationally
wrongful acts not constituting international crimes under
paragraph 2 as international delicts.

Since the list in

See Yearbook of the ILC 1980, vol. II, Part Two,
9.
pp.30-34, atr).32.
Ibid., draft Article 19, (2), and (3)(b).
10.
Ibid., draft Article 19, (2) and (3)(a).
11.
-
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paragraph 2 is not exhaustive, there may be a host of
internationally wrongful acts which may fall under either
category or partially under both categories.

For present

purposes, however, attention is confined primarily to terrorism
as an international crime. 12

2.

What are the Distinguishing Features of an
International Crime?

The criteria adopted in draft Article 19 point to the
"seriousness of the breach," the "essential importance of the
obligation breached" and "the necessity to protect the
fundamental interests of the international community."

The acts

listed, such as, acts of aggression, colonial dominance, genocide
and apartheid, are glaring examples of offenses against the peace
and security of mankind.

Terrorism has recently been added to

such a list in the context of the draft code of offenses against
the peace and security of mankind.

Terrorism appears to answer

all the three criteria of an international crime, having regard
to the seriousness of the breach, the importance of the
obligation breached and the necessity to protect the fundamental
security interests and peace of mankind.
Another prerequisite might perhaps be found if the analogy
of an international crime in the private law sense can be

12. For the mixed reception of draft article 19 as
reflected in the debates of the Sixth Committee in 1978-1982, see
Marina Spinedi:
"Les Crimes Internationaux de L'Etat Dans Les-Travaux de Codification de la Responsabilit~ des Etats Entrepris
Par les Nations Unies," EUI Working Paper No. 88, Feb. 1984,
pp.4 2-4 6.
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adopted.

The attributability of an internationally wrongful act

is completed without regard to the question of fault on the part
of the state or international organization.

As has been seen,

the wrongful acts are attributable even when the officials or
organs of the state act in excess of or against instructions.
This is close to the theory of strict or absolute liability or
liability without fault.

The state is in a way vicariously

responsible for practically all the acts of its officials or
organs performed in that capacity even though outside the scope
of their normal functions.

State responsibility may be said to

be thereby engaged.
To complete the components of an international crime, in
private law or otherwise, the maxim:
mens sit rea" is still valid.

"Actus reus non facit nisi

The state of mind to be imputed to

the state or international organization must be one satisfying
the test of the existence of a criminal intent, so as to render
an internationally wrongful act a crime.

By way of illustration,

out of frantic panic, a fighter pilot mistook an intruding
commercial aircraft as a hostile fighter-bomber and without
following normal procedures for intercepting civilian aircraft
shot it down without due warning in breach of international civil
aviation regulations.

The act is clearly an internationally

wrongful act, and would also be an international crime had the
pilot intended to shoot down an innocent commercial airliner.
The results would be the same if the missiles were to be fired
from air-to-air or from ship-to-air, or if the shot was
authorized at the moment of clear and present danger.

- 9 -

The only

difference would be that the downing of such commercial airliner
with passengers would be an internationally wrongful act without
being an international crime, only if the intention imputed to
the state was self-defense or self-protection even though it
turned out to be a mistake of identity or otherwise.

But if the

intention was unmistakably to shoot down an unarmed civilian
aircraft in regular commercial flight, the act of terrorism would
have been accompanied by the criminal intent clearly imputable to
the state or international organization, as the case may be.

3.

Are the Consequences of State Responsibility for
Terrorism as an International Crime the Same as Other
Internationally Wrongful Acts?

One question that has frequently been raised is whether a
state or international organization could ever be criminally
responsible for an offense constituted by acts of terrorism. 13
While opposition and doubts have been voiced in the General
Assembly, a good number of states appear to have accepted the
possibility of a state or international organization being
criminally responsible for internationally wrongful acts
constituting international crimes. 14

Without taking sides in

this acute controversy, it is sufficient to establish that a
state or international organization may be responsible under the
law of state responsibility for acts of terrorism as an
international crime.

It makes little or no difference whether

13. Marina Spinedi, ibid., at pp.45-47.
14.
Ibid., p.46, and notes 140-149, pp.152, and notes
129-132, pp.148-150.
-
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the private-law terminology of "criminal liabili ty" or the
international-law term of "state responsibility" is employed.
The issue is fully covered.

Compensation or reparation may still

be available even when wrongfulness is precluded by certain
circumstances. 15
The next logical step is to examine the consequences of
state responsibility or the secondary, as opposed to primary
rules of obligations flowing from its breach of the primary rules
requiring abstention from acts of terrorism.

The consequences of

state responsibility in respect of an international crime would
seem not to differ whether we call it criminal liability by name
or simply state responsibility.

Nor does it make any difference

in effect whether the same set of facts or circumstances are
characterized as an international crime or an international
delict.

IV.

LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME COMMITTED BY A
STATE OR AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.
Independently of the nature of the responsibility encumbent

on the state, whether or not it is designated as criminal,
certain legal consequences flow from the breach of its primary
obligation not to commit an act of terrorism as an international
crime.

The problem of definition of the international crime of

terrorism has been discussed elsewhere by other confreres at the
Colloquium.

The primary rules regarding components of acts of

15. See, in particular, draft article 35 of the draft
articles on~ate Responsibility, cited in note 9 above.
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terrorism as an international crime, including the wrongful act
and the criminal intent, has also been briefly mentioned.

We may

now proceed to consider the legal consequences of state
responsibility for terrorism as an international crime.
Following an interesting study made by the International
Law Commission in Part II of the draft Articles on State
Responsibility, certain principles appear to have emerged, which
may be stated in outline in more tangible terms.

(a)

The Three Parameters

On close inspection, the consequences in terms of rights
and obligations, as secondary rules, may consist in three
different parameters, namely:

(i)
(ii)

(iii)

The new obligations of the state which has committed
an international crime of terrorism;
the new rights of the injured state victim of the acts
of terrorism characterized as an international crime;
and
the rights and obligations of third states or third
organizations.

It is permissible to examine the secondary rules or legal
consequences of state responsibility in each of these parameters.

(b)

The First parameter! the State Committing an
International Crime 5~IS

Obligations on the part of the state responsible for acts

15~ See, e.g., Document A/CN.4/342 and Add. 1-4, Yearbook
of the ILC 1981, vol. II, Part one, pp.71-101, at pp.82 et seq.
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of terrorism characterized as an international crime include the
following steps:
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(c)

Ex nunc or an obligation to cease all wrongful
activities or acts of terrorism, or an obligation to
desist from further encouragement or assistance
furnished to perpetrate acts of terrorism as an
international crime. This obligation ex nunc only
applies to continuing wrong or violation, such as
intrusion of territorial air space which may be
stopped by withdrawal from the air space. On the
other hand, if the acts of terrorism consist in a oneshot or two-shots affair, then it is an accomplished
act which can no longer be stopped.
Ex tunc or an obligation to reestablish the situation
which would have existed if the breach had not been
committed, where restitution is still practicable.
Restitutio in integrum would be required of the state
which has committed an internationally wrongful act.
But the nature of the act does not always permit
restitution.
If, for instance, the aircraft was shot
and disintegrated in mid-air while the bodies of the
passengers killed were scattered over the ocean, no
resuscitation or reintegration would seem possible.
In such event, there would at least be an obligation
to pay the injured state a sum of money corresponding
to the loss suffered and not yet repaired.
Ex ante or an obligation to give satisfaction in the
form of formal apologies for the breach, a formal
reconfirmation of the obligation breached, or the
declaration to the effect that measures would be taken
in order to prevent recurrence of similar breaches.
Thus, an arrangement was set up to monitor flights of
commercial airlines in the polar or northern routes to
prevent the repetition of the downing of a civilian
aircraft in regular commercial flight.
An undertaking
to adopt appropriate measures to prevent recurrence of
such terrorizing acts would be in order.
The Second Parameter, the Injured State, Victim of
Terrorism as an International Crime

The injured state may demand fulfillment of, or compliance
with, secondary obligations, ex nunc, ex tunc and ex ante from
the state whose act was internationally wrongful.

The exercise

of corresponding rights would be permissible upon giving due
notification of the breach.

The injured state may resort to
-
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counter-measures to compel compliance with its demand or else to
suspend performance of its obligation under a bilateral treaty or
multilateral instrument which may yield satisfactory results.
Legitimate sanctions may be imposed to induce compliance, such as
boycotting or rupture of diplomatic relations or refusal to
extend recognition or withdrawal of recognition of the regime or
state engaging in acts of terrorism.

In particular, the injured

state is entitled to
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

(d)

cessation of the wrongful act if it is of a continuing
nature, or abatement of continuing injury or damage;
payment of appropriate compensation or reparation,
equivalent to the loss suffered; and
satisfaction by an assurance that similar wrongful
acts would be prevented in future by adopting
pre~ent~ve or prec~utionary mIgsures or more effective
monItorIng or warnIng system.
The Third Parameter, Third State or Every Other State

It is appropriate to complete the current analysis by a
brief examination of the contents of the third parameter, viz.,
obligations entailed by an international crime, such as
terrorism, for every other state.

Third states or every other

state may be said to be under the following obligations:

(i)

(ii)
(iii)

16.

not to recognize as legal the situation created by or
brought about by acts of terrorism, whether by taking
of hostages or assassinations or tortures;
not to render aid or assistance to the state or
organization which has committed such crime; and
to join other states in affording mutual assistance in
carrying out the obligations flowing from the acts of

Ibid., pp.9l-l01.
-
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terrorism. An international body, consisting of
member states, may adopt a resolution penalizing such
criminal acts or imposing sanctions on the recalcitrant state, by expulsion from the organization or
curtailment of its voting rights or other legitimate
sanctions proportional to induce compliance and
prevention of future repetitions. Measures envisaged
under this rubric may be adopted in conformity with
the procedures embodied in the United Nations Charter
with respect to the maintenance of internation~l peace
and security, and other multilateral treaties. 17

COMPLICITY
An analysis will be attempted in Part B of this paper to
comprehend the different methods and degrees of involvement of a
state in terrorist acts which would engage state responsibility.
Complicity may take different forms.

I.

STATE TERRORISM
This is a direct involvement.

When a state or its

officials or organs undertake or organize terrorist acts directed
against another state.

The state committing terrorism is the

author of the international crime of terrorism.

It is the

principal perpetrator of the crime, as if the button was pushed
by the state itself to destroy a peaceful civilian aircraft in
regular commercial flight deliberately to inflict loss of lives
on the passengers.
The state may do the planning, organization, or training of
terrorists to undertake terrorist activities against another

17. See Yearbook of the ILC 1985, vol. II, Part one (Sixth
Report by Professor Riphagen, A/CCN4.1389) at pp.13-14. See
Dinstein, in note 7, pp.14.
-
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state.

This could be done singly, or in concert with other

states or international organizations.

Equality of partnership

or joint-venture in the crime of terrorism may constitute a form
of complicity, beyond conspiracy as it takes the form of actual
participation.

All participating states or organizations act as

principals or partners in crime.

The division of labor may vary

from each act of terrorism, such as terrorizing a village, or
explosion of a school bus, by agents or organs of a state or more
than one state or organization.

II.

STATE-ASSISTED OR STATE-ENCOURAGED TERRORISM
Assisting or encouraging the commission of terrorist acts

engages the responsibility of the state for the international
crime as a form of complicity.
needed.

Active participation is not

Their assistance by giving information, lending

facilities, harboring terrorists from neighboring countries,
etc., may be sufficient to create responsibility of the state for
the act of terrorism.

Thus, the 1937 Geneva Convention on the

Suppression of Terrorism lB reaffirms "the principle of
international law in virtue of which it is the duty of every
State to refrain from any act designed to encourage terrorist
activities directed against another State and to prevent the acts
in which such activities take shape."

This obligation imposes on

every state not only the duty to refrain from assisting or

lB. See article 7 para 7 of the Convention, see compendium
of Relevant-rnternational Instruments, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/36B, at
p.lB.
-
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encouraging acts of terrorism, but also the duty to prevent and
punish activities of this nature, and also to collaborate with
other states for this purpose.

Failure to perform this duty

engages state responsibility for the resultant acts of terrorism.

III.

STATE-TOLERATED TERRORISM
The toleration of "activities organized for the purpose of

carrying out terrorist acts in another State" amounts to a crime
against peace and security of mankind as envisaged in the report
of Minister Doudou Thiam 19 to the International Law Commission.
The imputation of knowledge and therefore responsibility to the
state for whatever internationally wrongful acts conducted on its
territory within its own border is not unwarranted.

This is

consistent with the duty to warn, to abate and to prevent harm as
indicated in the Corfu Channel Case 1949. 20

Allowance,

permission, acquiescence or toleration of terrorist activities
known to be directed against another state clearly entails the
responsibility of the territorial state.

A state is under an

obligation to prevent the training, organization or preparation
of such activities within its territory.
It is conceivable in exceptional circumstances that the
territorial state may be aware of the activities being conducted
on its soil and remain yet powerless to prevent them.

The

obligation not to tolerate may in part be fulfilled by

19. Report of the ILC 1986, Yearbook, vol. II, Part two,
Article 11(4)0.
20.
ICJ Reports, 1949, p.4, at p.22.
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collaboration with an international authority or other states to
avert the danger resulting from terrorist activities or to inform
other states or international body of the situation.

IV.

MANUFACTURE, PROCURING, OR SUPPLYING OF ARMS, AMMUNITION,
EXPLOSIVES OR HARMFUL SUBSTANCES WITH A VIEW TO THE
COMMISSION OF A TERRORIST ACT.

The act of terrorism need not be the ultimate destruction
or seizure of victims or targets, but may comprehend other parts
of activities contributing to the materialization or final
consummation of a criminal act of terrorism.

Thus, as early as

1937 an international convention lists as prohibited "the
manufacture, obtaining possession, or supplying of arms,
ammunitions, explosives, or harmful substances with a view to the
commission in any country whatsoever of an offence" designated as
acts of terrorism.

It is the purpose for which arms and

ammunitions are procured, obtained, manufactured or supplied that
makes it an internationally wrongful act.

This is the initial

part of a series of acts composing the crime of terrorism.

It is

the knowledge or object of the supply of such harmful substance
that provides the linkage or complicity with the crime of
terrorism itself, for which the state as accomplice would be held
responsible.

CONCLUSION

The lesson to be learned from the preceding analysis of
state responsibility and state complicity in the context of
terrorism as an international crime is that a collective and

- 18 -

unified response to international terrorism is one effective
means to prevent or discourage the staging of terrorism.
Avowedly, states of different size, structure, ideology and stage
of economic development have openly opposed acts of terrorism in
every form or manifestation.

To implement this opposition,

states could collaborate more closely with the international
community by becoming parties or adhering to the international
instruments designed to prevent, suppress and punish acts of
terrorism. 21

By so promoting measures of prevention and

expanding the scope of enforcement of legitimate sanctions
against terrorism, the rate of such international crimes could be
lowered, if not immediately suppressed.

The Colloquium is

finding the right path and should be encouraged to continue its
search for ways and means to combat terrorist activities which
threaten the peace and tranquility of mankind.

Sompong Sucharitkul

21. See, e.g., The Tokyo Convention, on Offences and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, September 14,
1963, 704 UNTS. 219; The Hague (Hijacking) Convention, for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, December 16, 1970,
22 U.S.T. 1641, 10 I.L.M. 133; Montreal (Sabotage) Convention,
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, September 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 10 I.L.M. 1151;
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, December
17, 1979 U.N. Doc. A/34/819, 74 A.J.I.L. 277 (1980); Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents,
December 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 13 I.L.M. 41; European
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, November 10, 1976,
T.S. No. 90, 15 I.L.M. 1272; and recently, Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the safety of Maritime
Navigation, March 10, 1988, Rome, 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988) and
Protocol.
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